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In terms of geological shifts in climate, climate policy is a very young field. However, during 
the last two decades it has developed at a rapid pace. In 1987, the Brundtland Report first used 
the concept of sustainable development, followed in 1988 by the first meeting of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Toronto. The establishment of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 marked the 
birth of global climate policy.1 For the first time in history governments of almost all nations 
gathered to discuss the effects and consequences of and measures to be taken against global 
warming and agreed on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”2. The 
first decade of climate policy culminated in 1997 in the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, in 
which industrialized countries (37 so-called “Annex B countries”), agreed to reduce 
anthropogenic emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 5.2% below 1990 levels during 
the Kyoto commitment period, 2008-2012 (Article 3, UNFCCC, 1997).3 At the same time, 
developing countries, agreed to provide GHG inventory reports. As abatement of a ton of CO2 
eq. is equally effective for the global climate irrespective of the location of abatement, 
                                                 
1 The UNFCCC was signed May 9th, 1992 as part of the UN Conference on Development and Environment 
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro and entered into force March, 1994. By early 2008, 192 nations have ratified the 
UNFCCC, while 154 nations had signed the UNFCCC in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. 
2 This was done by differentiating countries into “Annex I”, i.e. industrialized countries and “Non-Annex I”, i.e. 
developing countries. 
3 GHGs covered under the Kyoto Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). All GHGs can be 
restated in terms of CO2-equivalent (CO2 eq.) by multiplying their quantity in tons with the 100 year global 
warming potential (GWP) of the respective greenhouse gas. Until October 2008, the Kyoto Protocol had been 
ratified by 182 countries. 
according to economic theory emissions should be reduced where the marginal cost of 
abatement is lowest (Dales, 1968; Coase, 1960). To reduce costs of compliance for Annex B 
countries, four flexible market mechanisms have been introduced to increase the efficiency of 
emission reduction opportunities by global trading: 
 
- Target reallocation (Bubble) (Article 4);4 
- Joint Implementation - JI (Article 6); 
- Clean Development Mechanism – CDM (Article 12); and 
- International Emissions Trading – IET (Article 17)5. 
 
International Emissions Trading (IET) allows governments of countries with commitments to 
sell unused shares of their emissions budgets, so called Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), to 
other countries that want to use more AAUs than they have been assigned in the Kyoto 
Protocol. The second mechanism, Joint Implementation (JI), permits the generation of 
emissions credits through emission reduction projects in an Annex-I country. These credits 
can be used by the acquiring (Annex B) country to fulfil its Kyoto commitments; an 
equivalent amount has to be deducted from the emissions budget of the country hosting the 
projects to avoid double counting (Michaelowa, 1995; Metz, 1995, Geres and Michaelowa, 
2002). The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows projects that reduce emissions in 
non-Annex I countries that do not have an emissions budget to generate emission credits that 
can be used by countries that have commitments. Finally, the CDM is the only instrument of 
the Kyoto Protocol that started before 2008. CDM credits (so-called Certified Emission 
Reductions, CERs) can be generated from 2000 onwards if early and serious consideration of 
the CDM in the planning of the project can be proven (Michaelowa et al. 2007). Due to the 
fact that all actors involved in CDM projects have an incentive to overstate emission 
reductions, there is a detailed body of rules whose implementation is checked through 
independent audits. A cornerstone of the rules is the principle of additionality, i.e. that a CDM 
project would not have happened without the CER incentive6. 
The Kyoto Mechanisms are the most innovative feature of the Kyoto Protocol and therefore 
particularly prone to impacts of uncertainty regarding general stability of climate policies, 
                                                 
4 This mechanism, although often omitted in the list of flexible mechanisms, is used by the European Union to 
achieve the emission targets as a group rather than as individual countries. 
5 There is a wealth of abbreviations in the Kyoto carbon market. For convenience, the most frequently used 
terms can be found in the Annex to this paper. 
6 The most recent version of the “Tool for the demonstration and assessment of Additionality” has been 
approved by EB 39 in its fifth version. 
rules for mechanism implementation and performance of projects under the project-based 
mechanisms. We focus on the CDM to illustrate the effect of those uncertainties. First, we 
identify sources of uncertainty at the policy, project and institutional level. We then look at 
their impact on the Kyoto market as a whole and provide recommendations for improvement. 
Section 2 deals with uncertainty in international climate policy and domestic climate policy of 
large players, especially regarding the lifetime of the Kyoto Protocol regime and domestic 
incentives for use of certified emission reductions. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the 
current CDM market and introduces the effect of real and perceived policy uncertainties on 
CER prices. Furthermore, the quality and performance of CDM projects, both of which are 
major determinants driving the environmental integrity and effectiveness of the mechanism 
are analyzed as an additional factor. Performance of the CDM in general and of specific 
project types in particular can give substantial price signals as some domestic climate policy 
instruments only accept certain types of CERs. Section 4 assesses external and internal actors 
in the Kyoto system and analyses how these actors influence the price of carbon. Moreover, 
this section makes recommendations to enhance transparency and regulatory stability. Section 
5 concludes the chapter. 
 
2. Uncertainty in International Climate Policy  
 
The key uncertainty on the international level is whether an international regime is applicable 
and binding, and for how long it lasts.  
The Kyoto Protocol initiated the “period orientation” of climate policy. The Kyoto 
commitment period runs from 2008 – 2012. For the time leading to and including this period, 
market participants, governments and institutions have a certain degree of planning security. 
The five year interval was chosen on the basis that a usual business cycle needs about the 
same time to complete. It is intuitive that the length of climate regime period is positively 
correlated with planning certainty for market participants. The fifteen year time-span from the 
drafting of the Kyoto Protocol until the end of the first commitment period in 2012 was 
believed to be an adequate investment horizon for businesses. But nobody expected the 
uncertainty of entry into force - for an interval of seven years between 1997 and the final 
ratification by Russia7 in November 2004, it was not clear if the Kyoto Protocol were ever to 
                                                 
7 The ratification by the Russian Federation was required to fulfil the condition that more than 55% of CO2 
emissions from Annex-I countries are included in the ratifying group (Article 25, KP). This was due to the 
refusal of the US to ratify, as the US was responsible for 36% of the emissions. 
enter into force8. The long waiting period for entry into force was due to the unwillingness of 
the US to ratify the Protocol, which then gave Russia a de facto veto power. Thus, even if 
decisions have already been taken on the international level, domestic interest groups and 
political interests of big emitters have considerable impact on the implementation of the 
international climate policy regime (for Russia see Michaelowa and Koch 2002; Burtraw  et 
al. 2001).9 
As the Kyoto Protocol only lasts until 2012, the current uncertainty due to the lack of a post-
2012 climate policy regime increasingly becomes similar to the situation before the Russian 
ratification. The “Bali Action Plan” foresaw that a final treaty would be finished during the 
15th Conference of the Parties (COP-15) 2009 in Copenhagen but this was not achieved. The 
key issue is stringency of emission targets. The Bali Action Plan contained a target corridor of 
25-40% emissions reduction by 2020 for industrialized countries. The EU has proposed a 
30% reduction target for itself if other industrialized countries embark on similar 
commitments. The Copenhagen Accord and the recent Cancun Agreement provide a 
framework for bottom-up country pledges by industrialized countries and advanced 
developing countries but no legally binding commitments.  
If market participants expect that the post-2012 Copenhagen treaty is weak in terms of 
emission reduction commitments, they have little incentive to engage in “early” action now 
and thus delay emission reducing investments. If on the other side actors expect stringent and 
enforceable emission targets, emitters have incentives for domestic reductions and purchasing 
emission reduction credits from the Kyoto Mechanisms.  
Similarly, big players such as the European Union have a large influence not only during the 
negotiations of the regime but also on setting incentives for the carbon market. The EU set up 
the only really large domestic policy with a concrete incentive for the Kyoto Mechanisms – 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which started operating in 2005 
and which has been linked to CDM and JI. In 2009, over 6 billion EU allowances (EUAs) 
were traded at a turnover of € 89 billion (Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010). In part II, we will 
discuss the key role of the emission allowance price for the pricing of certified emission 
reductions. In this context, a recent decision by the EU to severely restrain CER imports has 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, 39 CDM projects were submitted before Russia´s ratification, showing that some market actors 
were willing to take up the Kyoto risk. 
9 Michaelowa and Koch (2002) examine Russia’s possible reasons, including interest group rent seeking and 
Duma power issues, for not having ratified the protocol despite generous counting of sinks (and doubling of 
these sinks in Marrakech) and allocation of “hot air” permits (Michaelowa and Koch, 2002 pp. 563). Bernard, 
Paltsev, Reilly, Vielle and Viguier (2003) show in their paper using computable general equilibrium models how 
Russia faces a trade-off to maximise their revenue from emission permits versus the revenue from fossil energy 
exports. 
had a negative influence on the CER price. The EU is clearly aware of its key role in the 
Kyoto Market and willing to use this as a negotiation tool. This increases uncertainty in the 
market, as the market is “taken hostage” of political interests.  As the Kyoto Mechanisms and 
the resulting carbon market have entirely been established by government intervention, 
political decisions can in principle create new demand and similarly take away demand with a 
stroke of a pen (Michaelowa, 1998). For an analysis of the impacts of interest groups on such 
decisions see part III. A nice example of the impact of interest groups on policy decisions 
with a heavy impact on the carbon market can be seen in the US. Until 2001 there was 
considerable interest by US businesses in the carbon market and the Kyoto Mechanisms, 
which essentially had been included in the Kyoto Protocol on the request of the United 
States10. However, when President Bush refused ratification, US businesses specializing in 
the carbon market lost momentum and eventually European providers took the lead. As the 
few US businesses remaining active focused on domestic offsets only, they see the CDM as a 
competitor and therefore oppose it. At the same time, as European investors and carbon-
related businesses have already made substantial investments in the CDM market that would 
be worthless if the CDM was abolished they want to keep the system as it is11.  
The aspect of uncertainty about the future post-2012, even though the current CDM market is 
blooming, leads to a saw-tooth curve of uncertainty in which uncertainty about the potential 
follow-up post-2012 regime increases when approaching the end date of a period, without 
another follow-up treaty being decided. Similarly, uncertainty decreases when approaching 
the start date of a new period as more information enters the market and expectations are 
formed. This uncertainty is reflected in the volatility of the price for carbon. An optimal 
solution for the above problem is a series of commitment periods with established progress 
checks each period to give the right incentives to abate and invest also during the period 
rather than only at the beginning or the end. Given that climate treaties are international legal 
constructs in nature, sanctions, arbitration and other real enforcement mechanisms have to be 
in place to secure compliance. Also trade issues, involving competitive concerns of countries 
with and countries without strict environmental regulation have to be dealt with at the 
international level. Although enforcement and trade is beyond the scope of this text, it is 
interesting to note that a credible and working enforcement mechanism is a necessary 
condition for a good climate treaty and is able to diminish uncertainty about the 
                                                 
10 The positive experience gained by the US through the SO2 emissions trading regime, established through the 
Acid Rain Programme of the Clean Air Act in 1990, should not be underestimated here. 
11 Currently, the discussion focuses on reforming the clean development mechanism, especially the CDM 
institutions and the approval system. However, consensus among carbon-related businesses is to maintain the 
CDM as a tool to reduce greenhouse gases. 
environmental impact of the treaty.12 Ultimately, the uncertainty about the concrete policy 
framework affects the price and volatility of carbon commodities, which is discussed in the 
following part after a brief introduction in the carbon market.  
 
3. The state of the carbon market and the influence of real and perceived uncertainties 
on prices of carbon 
 
3.1 The regulatory framework of the carbon market 
 
At the highest level the Conference of the Parties and the Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP) 
shape current and expectations about future climate policy, but does only have legally binding 
power where the treaty has conferred such authority. The meetings take place once a year and 
give important signals for market participants. However, also decisions not taken or delayed 
by the COP/MOP can impact the market severely, depending on the respective issue. In the 
Kyoto Protocol, COP/MOP specified three distinct carbon commodities13: 
- Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). When the allocation of AAUs was decided in the 
negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol, Russia and Ukraine and countries of 
Eastern Europe got emission targets comparable to OECD countries. However, the 
economic transition and the related closure of heavy industries which occurred during 
the 1990s led to emissions decreases of 40 – 70%. The overall surplus of these 
countries, the so-called hot air is estimated at 5-7 billion t CO2 eq.. Its initial purpose 
was to provide the US with an easy way to reach its Kyoto target by agreeing on a 
bulk transfer of “hot air”. This bargain did not work and the “hot air” is about twice to 
three times as large as the combined demand of all OECD countries. Thus, 
theoretically, the CDM market could be eliminated overnight as the “hot air” can 
always sell at a lower price than CDM project developers. However, the countries in 
transition lost several years in setting up the institutions for selling AAUs, while 
OECD governments were reluctant to buy “hot air” due to expected opposition from 
non-governmental organizations. This might change towards the end of the 
commitment period once governments face the need to comply and do not have the 
budget to buy expensive CERs. 
                                                 
12 A good enforcement mechanism ensures that the environmental integrity of the treaty is ensured. 
13 Verified or Voluntary Emission Reductions (VERs), which belong to the voluntary market, are not part of the 
Kyoto compliance market. We will only look at the Kyoto market. 
- Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) under Joint Implementation (JI). JI suffered from a 
late start of the institutions on the UN level and host country problems similar to those 
encountered for assigned amount unit trades14 
- Certified Emission Credits (CERs) under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
The CDM has the twin objective to reduce emissions and to contribute to sustainable 
development (SD) of the country in which the project is implemented. 
 
A complex array of institutions has been set up after 2001 to guarantee the twin objective of 
environmental integrity and sustainable development of the CDM. At the core, the CDM 
Executive Board (EB) decides about the technical rules and the registration and issuance of 
CERs for CDM projects.15 Over time, the EB has created a number of supporting panels16, 
including the Meth Panel, the Small-Scale (SSC WG) and the Afforestation and Reforestation 
(A/R WG) working groups, the Registration and Issuance Team (RIT) and the Accreditation 
Panel (CDM AP), which provide technical expertise and prepare recommendations for the 
EB.17 Since late 2006, a sizeable number of staff has been hired by the UNFCCC Secretariat 
to support the Executive Board’s work. Over time, the rules for formal acceptance of projects 
under the clean development mechanism have been elaborated by these institutions. In 
addition, on the private side project developers, financial institutions, Designated Operational 
Entities (DOEs), Designated National Authorities and local governments depend and interact 
with the rules established by the EB.18 A visual representation of the CDM institutions can be 
seen in Figure 1 below. 
                                                 
14 Joint Implementation projects can generate ERUs from 2008 onwards.  
15 The CDM Executive Board is following the guidelines decided by the Conference and Meeting of the Parties 
(COP/MOP) and is fully accountable to COP/MOP (3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 5) 
16 The CDM AP and the Meth Panel was established by EB 3; the A/R WG at EB 14 (Annex 8); the SSC WG 
following Decision 21/CP.8 in New Delhi, 2002 and the EB-RIT at EB 29. The Small Scale Panel had a short 
existence between April and August 2002, met three times and drafted simplified modalities and procedures for 
small scale projects. 
17 The Kyoto market developed a whole array of new terms and abbreviations. A glossary of terms is attached at 
the end of this article for reference. 
18 Another challenge that can arise from such a multi-layer structure is the anti-commons problem, which means 
that certain players can delay progress if it is in their (rent-seeking) interest follow such a strategy. However, the 
rent-seeking argument loses some momentum as the governmentally established entities and their private 
counterparts are under high critical scrutiny by the public and the media (Buchanan and Yoon, 2002). 
                                
                                 Figure 1: CDM institutions    Source: Michaelowa et al. (2007) 
Since 2001, the market for CERs has been constantly growing. The main driver has been that 
CERs can be sold into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme through the EU linking directive 
(2004/101/EC). The linking directive governs the imports of certified emission reductions and 
emission reduction units for compliance under the EU ETS; the import of AAUs is not 
allowed. Until late December 2010, 2700 projects had been registered, 500 million CERs 
issued and 1.9 billion CERs are expected until 2012 from these projects. Furthermore, over 
three thousand more projects are in the pipeline.19 
Despite this success, due to the multiple institutions and participants involved in the CDM 
project cycle, different degrees of uncertainty pervade the market. An initial uncertainty in the 
CDM market was whether so-called “unilateral” projects are allowed, i.e. projects that are 
fully financed and organized by an entity from a developing country. The decision of the 
CDM Executive Board in May 2005 to allow unilateral projects immediately triggered a 
strong inflow of projects. While previously only a handful of projects had been submitted 
every month, within 6 months 100 projects per month came in. This unexpected surge 
stretched the CDM institutions. Members of the EB had to check all the submitted projects 
themselves. As they put faith into the validators, only 6% of projects submitted for 
registration in 2005 were put under review and 1% rejected. Therefore, project developers 
expected that once a project is validated, it achieves registration. However, the EB set up a 
second layer of scrutiny in 2006, the Registration and Issuance Team whose experts check the 
validation report and Project Design Document (PDD) for conformity with CDM rules. In 
2006, rejection rates increased to 3%. In 2007, the revenues from the administration fee paid 
to the EB allowed hiring of a substantial number of support staff, which does a third level 
check of documentation. In 2007, rejections jumped to 8% and they increased to 10% in 2008 
                                                 
19 In a recent report validators (so-called Designated Operational Entities - DOEs) have stated that more than 
hundred projects that are currently in the validation phase will never reach registration due to additionality 
reasons. However, the data remains confidential for reputational issues of the respective project developers, who 
handed in the project (Dornau 2008). 
and 2009. Uncertainty of project developers regarding registration of a project proposal has 
thus increased substantially. 
The interaction of CDM institutions has an important impact on the investment and planning 
security of the system. This interaction will be assessed in section 4 of this chapter.  
 
3.2 Pricing of emission credits 
 
Differences in perceived uncertainties generated differences in pricing of different greenhouse 
gas market units right from the beginning. We show this by some examples before starting a 
systematic discussion why prices have not yet converged. Before the Kyoto Protocol entered 
into force, prices for certified emission reductions from CDM projects reached only 3 $. 
When the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme was decided, the price for EU 
allowances established itself at a much higher level – initially 8 € and later up to 30 € as the 
EU ETS was seen as a stable source of demand. The acceptance of CERs in the ETS 
generated certainty about their use and an increase in price followed. The EU Commission’s 
threshold for the use of Kyoto Mechanisms credits for compliance is unlikely to be binding, 
but has been used as an argument for a price discount of Kyoto credits compared to a EUA. 
For a long time, the lack of the “International Transaction Log” (ITL), which is required for 
transferring Kyoto units between registries of different countries has also been used as an 
argument for price differentiation between CERs and EUAs. 
We see the following three conditions for price convergence of similar commodities: 
transparency of the market, homogeneity of the product, free and undisrupted trade, following 
Jepma (2007). The last two conditions are closely linked in case of the EU ETS and the CDM 
market: We discuss whether they are likely to emerge in the international greenhouse gas 
market. 
In the EU ETS market the transparency of the market is dependent on the information about 
which installations in the market get how many allowances in which way and if the market 
has a surplus or a deficit of EU allowances. For example only after the verified and monitored 
emissions data of EU member states has been published for 2005, market participants realized 
that EUAs had been over-allocated (Buchner and Ellerman, 2006). This led to a sudden price 
drop of allowances, from which they never recovered until the end of 2007.  
In case of the CDM market, decisions taken by the institutions should be transparent and 
consistent. This is not always the case. For example, the “completeness check” of the 
documents submitted for registration of a CDM project by the UNFCCC Secretariat, in early 
2008 took on average 2 months. Furthermore, in the first econometric analysis of Executive 
Board and Methodology Panel decisions, Flues et al. (2008) find that the degree of 
transparency is higher for methodologies than for project approval/rejection. The authors find 
that EB membership of the country concerned in project decisions raised the chances of 
approval in the past. Although it might be helpful in reducing the rejection rate, it is opaque 
and not supported by any decision of the EB or the Conference of the Parties. On another 
note, cement blending projects that easily got registered in 2005 now are routinely rejected. 
The market for certified emission reductions is characterized by different prices for CERs 
depending on the stage of the project and the type of contract. Since CERs are generally sold 
in forward contracts (so-called primary CERs), uncertainty about the creditworthiness of the 
seller and the buyer, the performance of the technology and the risk of rejection of the project 
influence the price quoted in a carbon contract. The allocation of these risks to the parties in 
the contract leads to price differences. The more advanced a project is in the cycle and the 
closer a project is to issuance by the Executive Board, the higher the CER price. Liabilities 
play a key role for risky contracts.20  
Moreover, Michaelowa et al. (2008) show that CDM performance regarding the number of 
CERs expected for delivery and the actual number issued is substantially different between 
project types. In an analysis of 203 projects, Michaelowa et al (2008) show that issuance 
success is between is 15 % for geothermal projects and over 120 % for N2O projects. More 
worrying is that also frequently applied project types such as hydro and biomass power plants 
have low issuance delivery rates in the range of 80-85 %. Also issuance success differs 
between project developers, with the first large victim of the carbon market being the 
company AgCert, which specialized on methane recovery and flaring from pig manure. Its 27 
projects so far had delivery rates of less than 20 %. The increased awareness regarding the 
variety of risks – some analysts differentiate between over 70 types of risks – has led to an 
increased price differentiation according to risk allocation over time (Richardson 2008). 
Primary CERs with the volume risk fully on the buyer side traded around 3 € until early 2005 
and 5 € from 2005. Primary CERs with a firm volume and monetary compensation for 
underdelivery started to get a premium in 2005 which rose to 3 € in 2006 and 5 € in 2007. 
Guaranteed CERs, i.e. CER portfolios aggregated by financial institutions with a high credit 
rating, were available from the second half of 2007 and have traded at a discount of about 1 € 
to the price of issued CERs, so-called secondary CERs (Capoor and Ambrosi 2008). At the 
end of March 2008, IDEAcarbon (2008) started a weekly market survey with four categories. 
                                                 
20 For a good analysis and an overview of how carbon contracts can be structured see Chapter 20 in Streck and 
Freestone (2005). 
The lowest tier has the buyer taking methodology, validation, registration and volume risk and 
a 50% forward payment. In the second tier, the seller takes the methodology and validation 
risk. In the third tier, the seller takes the registration risk, while the buyer pays on delivery and 
in the fourth tier the seller takes the volume risk. The price range within each tier was higher 
than the average price difference between tiers, showing the influence of project type and host 
country risks. 
The homogeneity of the carbon commodities and free undisrupted trade are related subjects in 
the carbon trading universe. In principle homogeneity is established by the EU linking 
directive. In general terms, EUAs and CERs allow its holder to emit one ton of CO2 eq. or to 
convert to such a right, respectively. In theory, CERs and EUAs should thus trade at the same 
price. However, it is notable that even issued CERs, for which no delivery risk exists, do trade 
at a discount to EUAs. A potential reason could be regulatory decisions, highlighted in Figure 
2, by the EU and the EB about the future of the Kyoto market. For example, the UNFCCC 
announcement in August 2007 that the ITL would become functional in November 2007 led 
to a substantial drop in the EUA-CER spread. Despite the timely fulfillment of this promise, a 
registry-related problem remained until late 2008. All transactions of the EU ETS are 
registered in the CITL (Community Independent Transaction Log). Similarly, all international 
transactions in the Kyoto system, AAUs, ERUs and CERs are registered in the ITL. While 
linking the CITL and the ITL had been expected for no later than December 1st 2007, it took 
until mid-October 2008. This in turn meant that the free trading of EUAs in phase II was 
inhibited. Some countries, reacting to pressure from emitting interest groups, even refused to 
issue EUA to their installations before the ITL is linked to the CITL. At the same time, the 
missing link between the CITL and the ITL also meant that CERs generated by CDM projects 
could not be used for compliance in the EU ETS. Finally, in mid-October 2008 the ITL-CITL 
link was completed. The linkage did lead to the expected decrease in EUA-CER spread as can 
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Figure 2: EUA vs. CER prices in 2007-2008         Sources: (ECX, Reuters, Own calculations) 
Figure 2 depicts the price of Dec 2008 EUA Future Contracts, secondary CERs and their price differential both 
in absolute and relative values. Prices for primary CERs are often confidential information and are thus currently 
not available on a large scale for analysis. 
 
The subsequent arguments discuss reasons for volatility in EUAs and CERs and pricing 
differences between the two. Volatility in EU allowances stems from multiple factors, where 
the interaction of supply (the allocation of allowances) and demand (the emissions by covered 
installations) dictates the price. Moreover, the information and access of market information 
and expectations by market participants moves the market. As compared to phase I of the EU 
ETS (not shown in the figure) where an over-allocation of allowances led to a sudden collapse 
of the EUA price, phase II EUAs established a support line at around € 20/t CO2 eq. due to 
stringent decisions by the EU Commission that slashed most allocations. Only when it 
became clear in October 2008 that the financial crisis would lead to a decrease of heavy 
industry production, EUA prices fell substantially. Thus, expectations about future EUA 
demand drive the price. EUA prices fluctuate also in dependence of the amount of external 
credits that can be used for compliance. In phase II, the European Commission established an 
overall import limit of 1.4 billion t CO2 eq. (EU Commission, 2007). As the projected 
shortage in the EU ETS is about 1 billion t, this limit is not binding. In late January 2008, the 
Commission announced its intention not to allow any new imports beyond the limit for the 
time 2013-2020 if the overall EU reduction target was 20%. Only with a 30% target, 0.9 
billion t could be imported. Figure 2 shows the sharp increase of the differential between 
EUAs and CERs after the Commission announcement. Whereas the limit of CER credits is an 
arbitrary decision, which is at risk of being influenced by interest groups, it should be 
communicated in a transparent manner to enhance certainty for stakeholders.  
The announcement by EU Commission representative Slingenberg that certified emission 
reductions should be calculated according to very stringent benchmarks, thus leading to a “de 
facto discount of CERs” did not have an adverse effect on price of issued CERs and EUAs, 
which have increased in the same time period due to high fossil fuel prices (GTZ CDM, 
2008). However, it can cast a chill on the development of new CDM projects. 
Pricing in CER forward contract can be set as a combination of a weighted average of various 
factors, such as the actual EUA price at the time of CER delivery, an indexed price over a pre-
specified time period, a fixed price or various combinations of both (Streck & Freestone, 
2005). The impact of the choice of parameter can be striking: A contract specifying CER 
price in terms of phase I EUA price in December 2007 was settled at 0.03 €/CER, as the 
underlying EUA price had collapsed due to overallocation. Had the contract been determined 
in phase II EUAs, it would have had to be settled at 23 €. 
The pricing of post-2012 credits is another complicating factor. CERs for projects extending 
beyond 2012 trade currently at a large discount compared to CERs expected to be issued 
within the Kyoto Protocol commitment period and not many entities buy such CERs. Large 
buyers such as the World Bank can influence the market by their price offers for post-2012 
credits. Capoor and Ambrosi (2007) claimed “uncertainty of compliance value as one aspect” 
to discount the value of post-2012 CERs and reported prices of 2-4 €. Such low offers by 
large buyers cast doubt on a credible commitment to a continuation of the current climate 
policy regime and are even dangerous for the system. 
The huge pricing volatility, especially due to regulatory uncertainty, makes it difficult to 
secure a loan with the CER flows, especially if loan-providers expect the current system to be 
altered. Generally, the pricing of Kyoto credits depends on a multitude of issues involving 
energy prices, environmental regulation globally and domestically, risk perception and 
shifting, the behavior of large players and on decisions taken at the EU and UNFCCC level. 
At each stage uncertainties can arise if the information revealed and the transparency of the 
market is incomplete. In the following the interaction of key market participants will be 
examined in light of their influence on uncertainty in the market. 
 
4. Interaction of key actors in the Kyoto/CDM market and their influence and 
challenges with uncertainty 
 
In the Kyoto market various actors influence, and are impacted by, uncertainty. External 
participants shape the rules of the market and internal participants act within the market. 
However in some instances, external participants, especially if they are large, can impose or 
change the rules after which they themselves will act. 
 
4.1 External market actors 
 
Governments are involved at the COP/MOP level, but also at the supranational and at the 
domestic level implementing supportive policies to reach the Kyoto targets. They can directly 
join or to refrain from the CDM market or link the CDM to domestic policies such as the EU 
ETS. The duration of the third EU ETS phase has been specified as 2013 – 2020 even before a 
post-2012 climate policy regime has been decided. The stringency of the third phase - and 
CER demand, if imports are allowed - depends on the degree of credibility/enforcement of the 
20% energy efficiency improvement and 20% renewables targets for 2020. If companies with 
installations covered under the EU ETS replace them by renewable energy or reduce fossil 
electricity production due to a reduction in electricity demand, this leads to a reduction in 
demand for EUAs and CERs.  
A counteracting effect is the learning effect in the production of renewables equipment, which 
increases as more of this equipment is demanded and installed. Moreover, through economies 
of scale this can also make technology more accessible to CDM project hosts and thus lead to 
an increase in the supply of credits. 
Host governments of CDM projects can influence the functioning of the carbon market by 
giving project developers and external investors legal, investment and political security and 
assuring low or no barriers to technological transfer (Ellis and Kamel 2007). Investors 
demand lower risk-adjusted returns and are more willing to invest in countries where their 
investments are protected by legally enforceable contracts and regulations. The political and 
regulatory stability across electoral cycles of host countries is an important issue for all 
investments including the CDM. Investors and project developers have to be assured that 
country specific rules impacting the CDM project are not changed retroactively. Similarly, 
many CDM projects require technology imports. Host countries, which are at the same time 
producers or even exporters of the respective technology might be inclined to protect their 
domestic market. These host countries are in the difficult position to reduce barriers for 
incoming technology or to give in to domestic interest groups.  
Not only on the demand side, governments of large countries can influence the working of the 
market substantially by their regulatory decisions. For instance, China has set a price floor for 
CERs.21 The level of the floor is arbitrary and injects volatility into the market if the decision 
is not transparent and communicated accordingly. In theory, the effect of a price floor is that 
if the price floor is below the actual price of CERs, the floor is not binding and is a “safety 
net” for project developers, which are able to calculate with the price floor as the “worst case” 
scenario. If the price floor is exactly the price observed in the market, nothing happens. If the 
price floor is above the market price, supply of CERs exceeds demand, which would, in the 
absence of the floor, theoretically lead to a price decrease to the equilibrium level. However, 
the expected effect is that project developers are discouraged from producing CERs for which 
there is no demand. This is of course only possible if no other CER suppliers can enter the 
market, i.e. it requires control of a sufficient share of CER demand. Thus, price floors set 
unilaterally by governments of major CER suppliers are an important incentive signal for 
project developers and investors. 
Non-governmental organizations – both in host and industrialized countries – can oppose 
CDM projects due to attainment property rights of persons and communities in host countries. 
The displacement of people, and their income-generating activities by CDM projects is not in 
line with non-governmental organizations’ interpretation of sustainable development. Project 
developers ignoring the awareness-raising power of non-governmental organizations might 
face unwelcome surprises, as already seen in the context of CDM projects in the palm oil 
sector. These projects have difficulties to find buyers for their CERs.  
The unpredictability and interaction of decisions taken at the government level of Annex B 
countries increase the general uncertainty level for the Kyoto mechanisms. Decisions taken at 
the domestic level but having an impact on the global functioning of the market, should be 
communicated clearly and in a transparent manner, and carefully implemented as large player 
can have severe impacts on the market. 
 
4.2 Internal actors 
 
                                                 
21 China is very supportive of its CDM project developers, e.g. by providing a standard electricity grid emissions 
factor and introducing a maximum consultant fee for PDD development. On the other hand, the Chinese 
government utilizes China’s market power to tax CER revenues, e.g. HFC-23 by 65 %, as long as this does not 
adversely impact China’s market position. 
Project developers, as the name suggest, plan and develop projects. They are extremely 
vulnerable to uncertainty in the market. Many projects have expected crediting life cycles 
from seven to twenty-one years, well exceeding the Kyoto commitment period ending in 
2012. Thus, project developers need to assure a stream of CER flows that enables them to 
finance the respective project. This situation has a harmful effect on the additionality of 
projects: Since project developers cannot calculate with streams of CER cash-inflows post-
2012, or at least can currently not be assured a high enough price of CERs, additional projects 
are crowded-out by non-additional projects. Even if the EB and its panels are able to sort out 
non-additional projects, it increases the transaction costs of the system. The shift in preference 
by project developers to non-additional projects depends on the risk aversion and the 
possibility to take risk on the balance sheet of project developers (see also Lütken and 
Michaelowa 2008, for incentives of financiers). Large players have an advantage in 
comparison to smaller players, as it can be assumed that the former project portfolio is more 
diversified and exposure is smaller in comparison to the latter, all else equal.  
Buyers and sellers naturally have opposite incentives. Buyers want to buy at a low price and 
sellers are looking to sell at a high price. Sellers, such as project developers in unilateral CDM 
or other project partners in multilateral CDM, can engage already early during the CDM 
project cycle in the sales of CERs. By selling CER forwards, sellers can minimize their risk, 
but receive a lower price for their CERs. Buyers in such a transaction receive a low price but 
carry specific risks such as delivery, technology and regulatory risk.  
As buyers can buy carbon credits for various reasons such as immediate compliance, future 
compliance, and pressure from institutional and private shareholders22, also the exposure of a 
contract not fulfilled is different in the above cases. It can be assumed that exposure is highest 
for transactions used for immediate compliance and lower for transactions to please 
shareholder demands of reputational image of one´s company. Stock listed companies not 
complying with a regulation can be punished both by the regulator and the shareholder.  
In theory, company buyers under a compliance obligation should compare the price of the 
compliance tool to the cost of installing alternative cleaner production or energy generating 
technology. However, faith of the companies in long-term binding climate policy instruments 
remains limited. Electricity utilities continue to invest in coal-fired plants, which have an 
estimated life time of 30-40 years. This is well beyond the reach of current global and 
domestic climate policy. Therefore, it seems that utilities have substantial doubt in the 
seriousness and credibility of climate policy and continue with investments that do not deviate 
                                                 
22 The threat of environmental litigation can also be an incentive for firms to engage in purchasing CERs (Streck 
and Freestone, 2004). 
substantially from business-as-usual practices.23 A widely touted alternative for coal-fired 
plants is to implement carbon capture and storage (CCS) for new plants or as a retrofit for old 
ones. The technology is currently still in the testing phase, however, already now energy 
providers are lobbying for subsidies to install CCS. Without subsidies, CCS-equipped plants 
are expected to be more expensive than alternative renewable energy sources. CCS could 
influence the CDM market if it gets cheap enough to be competitive at the future CER price 
or if widespread use of CCS in industrialized countries reduces power plant emissions and the 
CER demand.  
A third party, intermediaries and traders, are linking buyers and sellers and help to make the 
market more efficient since intermediaries are able to gather more information than rational 
individual participants would do on their own. With this information intermediaries can time 
and structure the trades of carbon credits according to the market setting, and at the same time 
hedge themselves against risks in the market place. Traders have various income streams. 
They gain through arbitrage with the price differential between EUAs and CERs, through a 
long (short) position in a bullish (bearish) market and through the commission fee. More 
competition in the market for intermediaries and traders induces higher informational 
efficiency of the market. Therefore, promoting a stable and healthy intermediary market 
reduces uncertainty. At the same time experience from securities and corporate markets has 
shown that market manipulations and accounting scandals can lead to a sudden downturn of 
the market.24 A careful regulation of trading, market principles and optimized informational 
requirements decreases the volatility of the market and the risk of a sudden collapse. 
Validators and verifiers are responsible for the validation of projects and subsequently of 
monitoring actual emissions from CDM projects. Although the actual work is not requiring 
much personnel per se, it requires specific engineering and technological expertise and skills. 
Assuming a growing CDM market, in order to cope with the increasing demands of projects 
occurring worldwide, validators and verifiers should start to employ more personnel in the 
long-run. However, they do not do so because they fear that the CDM market might no longer 
                                                 
23 Energy providers have profited substantially during phase I of the EU ETS by free allocation of allowances by 
passing through the opportunity cost of allowances to consumers and other businesses. This has amounted by 
conservative estimates to about € 8-10 billion (Sijm et al. 2006; Cramton and Kerr 2002; Hepburn et al. 2006; 
Neuhoff et al. 2006). Therefore, for 2013-2020 full auctioning for allowances to energy providers was envisaged 
before lobbying by East European states led to some exemptions. Auctioning gives a clear and credible signal to 
energy generators to change their investment behavior. 
24 The 2008 financial crisis was caused by the sub-prime crisis in which mortgage obligations had been 
restructured multiple times with the help of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). The restructured product carried a 
better rating than its inherent risk level would suggest. As many CER transactions are structured with the help of 
SPVs, it is crucial for the credibility of the market to be assured of the quality and real risk of credits. 
exist after 2012. Here it seems that the market does not signal clearly that the demand of 
CDM-specialized personnel will grow in the long-term. 
 
5. Conclusion and final remarks 
 
Climate policies and the related markets suffer from the inherent uncertainty that is generated 
by political decisions. Market participants and governments did not know for a long time 
whether the Kyoto Protocol would actually enter into force and currently the continuation of 
the climate policy regime after 2012 is unclear. Moreover, uncertainty is generated through 
inconsistent application of rules by the institutions governing the market mechanisms, and 
random or opaque rule changes. Domestic and supranational regulation by big players such as 
the European Union can send both adverse and supporting signals to the market. Finally, there 
is an important uncertainty about the quality of mitigation projects and their actual 
performance, which influences the willingness of project developers and investors to 
undertake such investments. All these elements of uncertainty influence the carbon market 
price through changes in supply of and demand for emission credits. 
In contrast to markets that trade a tangible commodity, markets for CERs can be created and 
destroyed with a stroke of a pen. This leads to extreme short-term orientation, rent seeking 
behaviour and high volatility in market prices. These negative effects can be reduced if 
climate policy decisions have a long-term nature with clear consequences of non-compliance. 
Moreover, the markets should be regulated in a transparent manner. A liquid market with 
many players and different expectations decreases volatility and thus increases “certainty”; it 
also generates a lobbying potential that will make it difficult to enact political decisions that 
negatively impact the market. An independent institution overseeing international climate 
policy, acting like a central bank could be a solution, yet currently is politically unimaginable. 
 
Annex I - Glossary of Frequently Used Terms25 
 
Abbreviation and Explanation of most frequently used terms: 
 
AAU Assigned Amount Unit: The quantity of 
greenhouse gases that an Annex I country can 
release in accordance with the Kyoto 
Protocol, during the first commitment period 
of that protocol (2008-12). 
Annex I  
 
Annex I Parties: The industrialized countries 
listed in this annex to the Convention which 
                                                 
25 Adopted from Capoor and Ambrosi (2008). 
were committed return their greenhouse-gas 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 as 
per Article 4.2 (a) and (b). They have also 
accepted emissions targets for the period 
2008-12 as per Article 3 and Annex B of the 
Kyoto Protocol. They include the 24 original 
OECD members, the European Union, and 14 
countries with economies in transition. 
(Croatia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and 
Slovenia joined Annex 1 at COP-3, and the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia replaced 
Czechoslovakia.)  
CER Certified Emission Reduction: A unit of 
greenhouse gas emission reductions issued 
pursuant to the Clean Development 
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, and 
measured in metric tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent. 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism: The 
mechanism provided by Article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, designed to assist developing 
countries in achieving sustainable 
development by permitting industrialized 
countries to finance projects for reducing 
greenhouse gas emission in developing 
countries and receive credit for doing so. 
CITL Community Independent Transaction Log: 
Each EU Member State has its own national 
registry containing accounts which will hold 
the EU allowances. These registries interlink 
with the Community transaction log, operated 
by the Commission, which will record and 
check every transaction.  
COP Conference of Parties: The meeting of 
parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. 
CO2 CO2:Carbon dioxide 
DOE Designated Operational Entity: An 
independent entity, accredited by the CDM 
Executive Board, which validates CDM 
project activities, and verifies and certifies 
emission reductions generated by such 
projects. 
EB Executive Board (): The Executive Board 
supervises the CDM, under the guidance of 
the COP/MOP.  
ERU Emission Reduction Unit: A unit of 
emission reductions issued pursuant to Joint 
Implementation. This unit is equal to one 
metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. 
EUA European Union Allowance: The tradable 
unit under the EU ETS. One EUA represents 
the right to emit one ton of CO2. 
EU ETS European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme: The emissions permit trading 
scheme established by EU directive 
2003/87/EC. 
GHG Greenhouse gases: These are the gases 
released by human activity that are 
responsible for climate change and global 
warming. The six gases listed in Annex A of 
the Kyoto Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N20), as 
well as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur 
hexafluoride (SF6).  
ITL International Transaction Log: Verifies 
transactions (AAU, ERU, CER etc.) proposed 
by registries to ensure they are consistent with 
rules agreed under the Kyoto Protocol. 
JI Joint Implementation: Mechanism provided 
by Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, whereby a 
country included in Annex I of the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol may acquire Emission 
Reduction Units when it helps to finance 
projects that reduce net emissions in another 
industrialized country (including countries 
with economies in transition). 
KP Kyoto Protocol: Adopted at the Third 
Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Convention on Climate Change held 
in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997, the Kyoto 
Protocol commits industrialized country 
signatories to reduce their greenhouse gas (or 
“carbon”) emissions by an average of 5.2% 
compared with 1990 emissions, in the period 
2008-2012. 
Non-Annex I  
 
 
Non-Annex I Parties: 
Refers to countries that have ratified or 
acceded to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change that are not 
included in Annex I of the Convention.  
PDD Project Design Document: A project-
specific document required under the CDM 
rules which will enable the Operational Entity 
to determine whether the project (i) has been 
approved by the parties involved in a project, 
(ii) would result in reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions that are additional, (iii) has an 
appropriate baseline and monitoring plan. 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change: The international legal 
framework adopted in June 1992 at the Rio 
Earth Summit to address climate change. It 
commits the Parties to the UNFCCC to 
stabilize human induced greenhouse gas 
emissions at levels that would prevent 
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